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Introduction
The 2008 Farm Bill debate lasted more than a full year, with House Agriculture subcommittee
markups beginning in May 2007 and final passage, through veto override, finally being achieved
in May 2008. One of the major changes to the Commodity Programs Title was the creation of
the new Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) program, which is based on crop-specific
revenues at the state level, and serves as an optional alternative to the existing price-based
countercyclical program. Development of a safety net option based on crop revenues, rather
than prices, was widely supported by a number of national agricultural organizations including
the National Corn Growers Association, American Farm Bureau Federation, and American
Farmland Trust. Enrollment numbers in the program were initially low with less than 1,000
farms committed to the program as of June 2009. As the August enrollment deadline
approached, enrollment numbers increased sharply. Approximately 128,000 farms, comprising
more than 32.5 million acres, ultimately opted to enroll in the new program. This represents just
under 13 percent of total acreage enrolled in commodity programs.
A number of economists at land grant universities have provided the agricultural community
with educational materials, analysis and outlook, and payment calculator tools for the ACRE
program (e.g., AGDM 2009; AgManager 2009; AFPC 2009; Babcock 2009a, 2009b; FAPRI
2009; Farmdoc 2009; Zulauf 2009a, 2009b). These materials are generally directed to regional
audiences and, in addition to educating users on the specific mechanics of the ACRE program,
allow them to calculate ACRE payment levels under various yield and price scenarios. Many
economists have also provided recommendations and suggestions regarding the ACRE program
enrollment decision. The main consensus has been, given the complexities of the program,
enrollment decisions should be made only after the specific characteristics of the farm have been
carefully analyzed. 
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Economics from the University of Illinois.In this paper, potential or expected ACRE payments are provided for
corn, soybeans, and wheat based on historical yield and price
experience from 1977 through 2007.  Summaries of historical
payments are reported for all states for which at least 30 years of yield
data were available. For those farms that did not enroll in ACRE for
the 2009 crop year, there will be additional enrollment periods for
future crop years. Thus, these payment estimates are useful for both
operators and landlords as they continue to make their ACRE
enrollment decisions. Moreover, ACRE payment estimates will be of
value to lenders and rural appraisers in determining the potential
impact of the program on farm profitability and cash flows, and
farmland values and cash rent levels. Finally, as an additional
contribution, this article provides a number of references and links to
existing resources on the ACRE program. 
Choice between Traditional and ACRE Commodity Program Payments
The ACRE program is effectively a put option on a state-level revenue
index, where the option strike is set equal to a revenue guarantee based
on historical state yields and national price levels. ACRE began with
the 2009 crop year and serves as an alternative to the suite of existing
commodity programs which include direct payments, price-based
countercyclical payments, and marketing loan programs.  Producers
make the choice between ACRE and traditional programs at the Farm
Service Agency (FSA) farm level, with the option of deferring the
decision into future crop years.  However, once elected, all program
crops grown on the farm will be covered by the ACRE program
throughout the life of the current Farm Bill which applies through the
2012 crop year.
If elected, ACRE replaces the current price-based countercyclical
program (PCCP).  ACRE farms continue to be eligible for direct
payments and marketing loan programs.  However, direct payment
rates are reduced by 20 percent, and the loan rates which define the
marketing loan programs are reduced by 30 percent.  Table 1
compares direct payment and national loan rates for corn, soybeans,
and wheat under the traditional and ACRE program options as
outlined in the 2008 Farm Bill. National loan rates are then adjusted
to county-specific levels; the 30 percent loan rate reduction will apply
nationwide for ACRE farms.
Between 2009 and 2012, it is highly unlikely that PCCP payments
will be received under the traditional commodity program for the
three crops considered as market prices are expected to be well above
the PCCP trigger prices (Irwin and Good 2009).  Similarly, payments
from the marketing loan programs under either the ACRE or
traditional alternatives are highly unlikely for corn, soybeans, and
wheat.  As a result, direct payments are likely to be the only form of
support offered by the traditional programs option.  In comparison,
the ACRE option will result in smaller direct payments, but also
provide a greater likelihood of receiving payments from the ACRE
program.
Therefore, the expected level of support provided by the ACRE
option will be greater than traditional programs if expected ACRE
payments exceed the associated reduction in direct payments.
However, ACRE payments are uncertain at the time of enrollment
whereas the 20 percent reduction in direct payments represents
support which is foregone regardless of realized price and yield levels.
Additionally, risk management should also be considered in choosing
between the two options. Since the ACRE program is based on
revenues rather than prices, the program is able to provide support in
the event of poor yields as well as low prices. Thus, ACRE may be a
more efficient risk management program than the traditional
alternative.
ACRE Program Details
As previously stated, the ACRE program is based on a revenue index
at the state-level.  In any crop year, the revenue guarantee            for
each program crop is defined as 90 percent of the product of the 5-
year Olympic average state-level yield                    and the 2-year simple
average of the U.S. marketing year average price                    . For example,
the 2009 revenue guarantee for corn acres in Illinois is based on
average Illinois corn yields from 2004 through 2008, and the 2007
and 2008 marketing year average prices for corn. The Olympic
average for yields is found by dropping the maximum and minimum
yield levels over the 5-year period and then taking the simple average
of the remaining three years.
(1)
By definition, the revenue guarantee will adjust each year with
changes in market prices and yield levels.  However, the adjustments
to the state-level revenue guarantee are limited to 10 percent from the
previous crop year’s level.  This rule sets lower and upper limits, or
cups and caps, on the revenue guarantee for each crop year beginning
in 2010.  Actual revenue for the crop year                           is then equal
to the product of the actual state-level yield                         and U.S.
MYA price                        Again, using Illinois corn acres as the example,
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the 2009 Illinois average corn yield and the national marketing year
average corn price for 2009.
(2)
State-level ACRE payments are triggered if actual revenue falls below
the revenue guarantee. However, the ACRE program operates under
a “double trigger” eligibility rule.  Farm-level revenue losses must also
be proven for a producer to be eligible for an ACRE payment.  The
farm-level revenue guarantee, or farm benchmark revenue,                     is
calculated as the product of the 5-year Olympic average of farm-level
yields                    and the 2-year average of the U.S. MYA price 
.  Any multi-peril, Federally-subsidized crop insurance
premiums paid by the producer (I) are also included in the farm’s
benchmark revenue.  Actual farm-level revenue                is calculated
as the product of actual farm yield                    and the U.S. MYA price
for the current year                    .  An important implication of the double
trigger rule is that not all farms may receive an ACRE payment in a
year in which payments are triggered at the state level. Also, farm-level
losses alone will not trigger an ACRE payment.  Revenue shortfalls




If both state- and farm-level revenue measures fall below their
respective guarantees (i.e.,                       <                   and              the
farm is eligible to receive an ACRE payment.  The payment per
planted acre (Payment) is equal to 83.3 percent of the product of the
state revenue shortfall and a farm yield factor.  The farm yield factor is
equal to the ratio of the farm and state benchmark yields, and acts as a
scaling factor to tailor payment levels to farm-level productivity.
Additionally, ACRE payments cannot exceed 25 percent of the
revenue guarantee for the year on a per-acre basis.
(5)
Historical ACRE Payments — Methods 
We generate the expected level of ACRE payments for corn, soybean,
and wheat acres across a variety of states using an approach relying on
historical price and yield experience.  These expected ACRE payment
amounts can then be used by farm operators and landowners to assess
differences in expected returns between the ACRE and traditional
alternatives. Expected ACRE payments were estimated by conducting
a historical analysis of program performance had the program existed
from 1977 through 2007.  The ACRE payments for each year were
then divided by the corresponding year’s revenue guarantee to provide
payment levels in percentage terms. A state revenue factor was then
defined for each state as the average payment level as a percentage of
the revenue guarantee.  The product of the historic state revenue
factor and the state revenue guarantee in 2009 multiplied by the 83.3
percent payment rate results in the average expected ACRE payment
for the state.  This procedure accounts for the fact that state revenues
have increased over time due to increased yield and price levels, and
provides estimates of expected ACRE payments represented in 2009
dollars.  Furthermore, this procedure assumes that the likelihood of
receiving payments and their expected size, stated as a percent of the
state guarantee, will remain constant over time.
The details of the procedure are illustrated in Table 2 for corn acres in
Illinois.  Columns 2, 3, and 4 of Table 2 report the prices, yields, and
revenue guarantees for the ACRE program, respectively, which would
have been used had the program been available from the 1977
through 2007 crop years.  The ACRE price denotes the benchmark
price used to calculate the revenue guarantee for each year, and equals
the average of the previous two years’ MYA prices.  For example, the
benchmark price for 1977 would have equaled $2.35, or the average of
the 1975 and 1976 MYA prices of $2.54 and $2.15 per bushel.  The
ACRE Yield equals the Olympic average of yields for the previous five
crop years.  In 1977, the benchmark state yield for Illinois would have
been set at 103 bushels per acre based on average corn yields from
1972 through 1976.
The Revenue Guarantee then equals 90 percent of the ACRE price
times the ACRE Yield, with the exception of when this calculation
results in a move of more than 10 percent from the previous year’s
state revenue guarantee.  Table 2 also illustrates when the changes in
the revenue guarantee would have been limited by the 10 percent cup
and cap rule.  For example, the state revenue guarantee of $218 in
1978 would have been limited on the low end since the product of the
ACRE price ($2.09) and the ACRE yield (102) would have been
more than 10 percent below the $242 state revenue guarantee for the
previous year.  As can be seen in Table 2, changes in the revenue
guarantee for corn acres in Illinois would have been limited in 17 out
of the 31 years considered.
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as a percentage of the revenue guarantee, for each year. In 1977, actual
revenue was $208 for corn acres in Illinois, which would have resulted
in an ACRE payment of $34 per acre planted to corn. Thus, the state
revenue factor for Illinois corn in 1977 equaled 14 percent ($34
payment/$242 guarantee).  In Table 2, positive ACRE revenue factors
are reported for each year the program would have triggered a
payment on Illinois corn acres.  Between 1977 through 2007, ACRE
would have triggered payments in 10 out of the 31 years, with an
average size of 3.4 percent of the revenue guarantee. This is equivalent
to an expected ACRE payment level of $17.67 per acre for Illinois
corn.  Similar calculations were made for corn, soybeans, and wheat
for all U.S. states where at least 30 years of yield and price data were
available from 1977 to 2007.
Historical ACRE Payments — Results
Historical ACRE payment statistics for corn across selected states are
provided in Table 3.  Considerable variability exists across states, with
average historical payments ranging from $3.77 in Utah to $42.49 in
West Virginia.  For Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa – the heart of the
cornbelt – history indicates that ACRE payments will average $17.67,
$16.92, and $14.59 in those states, respectively.  Direct payments in
these areas average between $20 and $25 per acre.  Hence, farms
enrolled in ACRE will realize a reduction in direct payments of $4 to
$5 per acre and should expect to receive a greater level of funding
from the ACRE option.
The probabilities of ACRE payments being triggered on corn acres
range from a low of 9.7 percent per year in Arizona and on irrigated
corn acres in Arkansas, to 38.7 percent in California.  Within the
cornbelt, percentages are 32.3 percent for Illinois, 25.8 percent for
Indiana, and 22.6 percent for Iowa.  Hence, it would be reasonable to
expect that, within the major corn production regions of the U.S.,
ACRE payments will be triggered an average of one out of every three
or four years.
The historical analysis for soybean acres is summarized in Table 4.
Expected ACRE payments for soybean acres range from $5.73 per
acre in South Dakota to $24.62 per acre in Oklahoma.  Expected
ACRE payments on soybean acres are $7.81 for Illinois, $8.40 for
Indiana, and $14.52 for Iowa.  Similar to corn acres, expected ACRE
payments for soybeans exceed the reduction in direct payments that
would be required for ACRE program enrollment in these cornbelt
states. The probability of payments being triggered on soybean acres
varies significantly from 16.1 percent in the states of Illinois,
Kentucky, Louisiana, and North Carolina to more than 40 percent in
Florida.
The historical experience on wheat acres, reported in Table 5,
indicates a similar level of regional variability, in percentage terms, to
that experienced on soybean acres. However, variability in terms of
dollars per acre tends to be much higher on wheat acres. Average
expected payments range from $6.18 per acre in Colorado to more
than $60 per acre in Florida. Expected ACRE payments on wheat
acres in the cornbelt also exceed the loss in direct payments required
for program enrollment. Expected payments in the top wheat-
producing states of Kansas and North Dakota were calculated to be
$6.59 and $12.48 per acre, respectively, further illustrating the greater
variability in historical ACRE program performance on wheat acres.
Our results consider the payment trigger rules at the state level only,
implicitly assuming an average farm yield equal to the average state
yield in reporting the level of potential ACRE payments. However,
the farm trigger rule must also be considered since the triggering of
ACRE payments at the state level does not necessarily guarantee farm
eligibility.  The level of correlation between yields at the farm and
state levels, or how closely farm- and state-level yields follow each
other, is the main factor in determining the likelihood of a farm being
ineligible for an ACRE payment.
Schnitkey and Paulson (2009) used historical farm-level yield data
from the Illinois Farm Business Farm Management Association to
assess the effect of the farm trigger rules. They found that, on Illinois
corn acres, between 78 and 86 percent of farms would have met the
farm trigger criteria for ACRE payment eligibility in years in which a
payment was triggered at the state level. On soybean acres between 81
and 93 percent of farms would have met the farm trigger criteria in
ACRE payment years.  Including a $20 per acre crop insurance
payment was found to increase the percentage of farms meeting the
criteria by five to ten percent for both corn and soybean acreage.
Similar results could be expected for other cornbelt states.  
Potential Impacts on Cash Rents and Farmland Values
Economic theory suggests that, due to competition among tenants for
an inelastic supply of farm land, subsidies should be fully capitalized
into land values and cash rent levels. Previous research has shown that
cash rent levels generally increase (decrease) as Federal subsidy levels
increase (decrease).  However the form of the subsidy, and the degree
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(Lence and Mishra, 2003). Furthermore, a recent study by Kirwan
(2009) found that a much smaller share of federal subsidies – only 25
percent – accrues to landowners through changes in cash rent levels. 
Since ACRE is an optional program, one could argue that rational
producers and landowners would only elect to enroll farms for which
ACRE resulted in greater expected payments than what is given up in
terms of direct payments and the value of loan rate reductions.  This
would further imply that cash rents, and land values, would have to
either increase or remain constant (all else equal) if a farm is enrolled
in the program. However, the magnitude of this effect would likely be
reduced by the fact that ACRE is new and relatively complex, which
is one of the top reasons cited by producers for deciding not to enroll
farms in the ACRE program. 
Again using cornbelt states as an example, ACRE might be expected
to increase cash rent levels by as much as $12 per acre per year – the
difference between expected ACRE payments and the reduction in
direct payments in this region. In a discounted cash flow framework,
land values might be expected to increase by a larger amount
depending on an individual’s discount factor and whether ACRE is
expected to be a permanent support program. However, because
ACRE payments are uncertain, it is unlikely that the full expected
difference between ACRE support and foregone direct payments –
which are certain payments – will be capitalized into cash rents or
land values.  Additionally, as was illustrated by the historical ACRE
payment calculations, program performance may vary significantly
across both states and crops, with some regions not realizing an
increase in expected support levels from enrolling in the ACRE
program.
Other Considerations for the ACRE Enrollment Decision
The decision to elect ACRE program coverage or to remain in the
existing programs hinges on a number of factors.  The ACRE
program is based on a state-level revenue index that will adjust over
time whereas the countercyclical program is based on fixed target
price levels.  If state revenue levels remain fairly stable, or increase
through 2012, the likelihood of ACRE payments being triggered is
relatively low and total payments from the traditional programs will
be greater due to the higher direct payments.
If price levels decline but stay above target price levels, the ACRE
program may generate large payments while no support would be
provided by the countercyclical program.  If prices fall below target
price or loan rate levels the ACRE program could potentially reach
payment limits.  In this situation countercyclical payments would also
be triggered, and any marketing loan gains or loan deficiency
payments that would be generated would be larger under the
traditional option because of the 30 percent reduction in loan rates
associated with the ACRE program.  Therefore producers need to
assess their expectations with respect to future price levels. In general
the traditional program option will result in higher direct payments,
but provide little support for price declines in the range of current
levels and target prices for corn, soybeans, and wheat.
Other issues that need to be considered include the relationship
between farm and state yields, and the availability of historical records
and documentation requirements for proving farm-level yields.  If
farm yields tend to closely follow the state average, the farm trigger
criteria will have a greater chance of being met in years when ACRE
payments are triggered.  The timing of payments is yet another issue
that should be considered.  Because of the definition of the price
component used by the ACRE program, the revenue guarantee will
not be established prior to sign-up periods in future crop years and,
given the use of MYA prices, the actual revenue measure used to
determine ACRE payments will not be determined until prior to
harvest of the following crop year. As a result, ACRE payments
associated with any given crop year will likely not be made until the
harvest of the following crop year. 
Base acre allocations and future plans for planted acreage should also
be examined.  For example, in the cornbelt, the actual reduction in
direct payments will be larger for farms with higher proportions of
corn base acres relative to soybeans or wheat. Thus the relative cost of
ACRE enrollment is contingent upon a farm’s base acreage and
current production practices.  Because payments are based on planted
acreage, support offered by the ACRE program may more accurately
reflect current practices, especially if they differ considerably from
base acre allocations.
Conclusions
Introduction of the new ACRE program gives producers the option
of electing commodity program support based on a state-level revenue
index which can adjust, at least partially, through time to changes in
yield and price levels.  The ACRE program is an optional alternative
to the existing countercyclical program which is based on legislatively
fixed target prices.  Producers must give up a portion of their direct
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guaranteed dollars to be eligible for an uncertain, or contingent,
payment from the ACRE program.
Using an historical approach, we provide long-term expected ACRE
payments for corn, soybean, and wheat acres across a variety of U.S.
states.  Results indicate that, within the cornbelt, ACRE payments for
all three crops considered are likely to exceed the typical reduction in
d i r e c t  p a y m e n t s  r e q u i r e d  f o r  A C R E  e n r o l l m e n t  i n  t h a t  r e g i o n .
However, historical experience outside of the cornbelt was found to
be significantly more variable with respect to the expected size and
probability of ACRE payments being triggered. Thus, as
recommended by most extension economists, the decision to enroll a
farm in the ACRE program hinges heavily on the specific
characteristics of that farm, including yield histories and the
relationship between farm- and state-level yields.
For the three crops considered – corn, soybeans, and wheat – current
market conditions suggest that prices are rather unlikely to fall below
target price and loan rate levels in upcoming crop years.  This implies
that direct payments are likely to be the only form of support offered
through the traditional alternative.  Even for the cornbelt region,
ACRE payments may not be triggered, resulting in greater support
coming from the larger direct payments available under the traditional
option. However, the value of the ACRE program should be
considered from both an expected payment and risk management
perspective.  Since ACRE is based on relatively current price and yield
levels, the program has the potential to trigger payments under
conditions where the price-based countercyclical program would not
provide support.
Agricultural economists have done a significant amount of analysis on
the new ACRE program.  While the examples provided in the
references section of this paper do not represent an exhaustive set of
the available resources, readers are encouraged to utilize the
information.  The ACRE program represents a relatively significant
change in the design of Federal support for agriculture.  Given the
program’s revenue-based design, it has the potential to impact farm
profitability and cash flows under different conditions than current
programs. Since ACRE enrollment is tied to the farm – rather than
the operator – it also has the potential to impact land values and cash
rent values over the coming crop years. The optional nature of ACRE
implies that land values and cash rents may increase for farms that are
enrolled in the program, although the magnitude of that increase will
vary due to both the expected size and likelihood of expected
payments, and more fundamental risk management factors.
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